service of the King or of some powerful Omrah, and who work exclusively for their patron' (Bernier, 1914: 256 , emphasis added; see also pp. 228-9 on patronage). As for the rank and file, 'virtually every relevant feature of the economy, society and the state was designed to hold the artisan firmly down to his lowly place ..' (Raychaudhuri, 1983: 214) .
Thus, this world of urban crafts was shaped above all by the consumer demand of a few hundred families that commanded almost the entire agrarian surplus of a large region. Powerful, extremely rich, and a handful, these buyers of craft goods directly employed artisans. There was no 'market' worth the name. They were the market. Skilled artisanate, even whole industries functioned mainly in a relationship of dependence on public authority. They were not employers. The courts did not depend on them. They were not a source of tax-revenue for the courts as their European counterparts were. They were employees or quasi-employees of the court. the crafts in demand were particularly intensive in craftsmanship, training was a vitally important issue. So was regulation of competition in the labour market. The guild, such as there were in urban north India, was either a body that maintained the hierarchy of craftsmen, or a quasi-administrative body engaged in facilitating transactions conducted by the courtiers.
In a somewhat better-known scholarship on medieval India, the irrelevance of the merchant guild has been argued by some historians along quite similar lines.
Merchants in Mughal India
In the history of the European and partially Middle-Eastern guilds, we observe a relationship of mutual dependence between the merchants and the state. In India too, there was mutual dependence between the merchants and the states, which in fact played a pivotal role in political transition in the eighteenth century. And yet, this dependence had quite a different flavour from what we observe in the history of the European guild. The eighteenth century dependence was driven by short-term self-interest rather more than by recognition of long-term compatibility of interests, it was influenced by fiscal collapse of small states, and it represented collaboration between political elements such as the individual princes and the merchants rather than between the state as the law-making institution and the merchants. Were guilds unattainable in South Asia? Were guilds unnecessary in South Asia?
Were guilds unattainable? Were rulers simply disinterested in the subject of granting exclusive rights to merchants? We must begin from the quite extensive scholarship on the merchant-state relationship in Mughal India. Perhaps the orthodoxy here is represented by a view, which suggests a broadly hierarchical and at times repressive relationship between the state and the merchants. Sixteenth century travelers in North India, the most articulate being the doctor François Bernier, articulated the idea. It had a long life among historians, and in broad terms, was accepted by the Aligarh School scholars. In the modern version of the same thesis, the Mughal state did not need the merchants as an ally because it earned more than enough money from land taxes (Blake, 1991; Pearson, 1990; see Mentz, 2005 for a discussion). In Mughal India, taxing the merchant was not a significant source of income for the state, and was thus left to a certain degree of arbitrariness, allowing local agency, and even extortionist practices. The bureaucratic state might stifle guilds or pre-empt these in two ways, by making merchants an unimportant 7 actor in fiscal administration, and by an atrophy of the town government, which became a mere point of land-tax administration rather than that of mercantile enterprise. This model can be contrasted with economic change in late-medieval Europe wherein the state's dependence on land taxes had fallen, the town had emerged a source of tax, merchants and urban administration could both be betteroff by collaborating, and the guild acquired its distinctive rights, even though these rights were later sold and resold to others, and eventually revoked.
It needs to be noted at this point that in subsequent research on South Asia, the concept of the bureaucratic state has been questioned. Princes who owned merchant marines or the 'portfolio capitalists' of the southeastern coast, and the notion of 'segmentary' rather than centralized state, modify the state-merchant opposition in fundamental ways (Stein, 1980; Subrahmanyam, 1990) .
Reinterpretation of eighteenth century northern India as a world in which merchant capital consolidated itself has a similar implication (Bayly, 1983) . If the centralized state concept needs revision, it remains true that a great deal of the commercial opportunities in the South Asian world was tied to land and land-tax. In that sense, merchant capital, where it was successful, was either relatively marginal to the territorial states, as in the case of the Indian Ocean trade, or part of their fiscal enterprise, as in the case of revenue farming.
If the formal guild or monopoly rights were unattainable, for most purposes it was rendered unnecessary in the presence of other types of collective institutions. Let us return to the artisan first. We know little about how the north Indian karkhana survived the eighteenth century. The history of some industries, such as shawls in Kashmir, suggests that the karkhana became a private firm catering to merchants in overland trade with Europe (Irwin, 1954) . In those industries where long-distance trade developed early, karkhanas must have altered their nature earlier. But such early transition was almost certainly not the rule. By and large the concentrations of skilled artisans in the eighteenth century tended to be cities with powerful regimes.
The fundamentally non-market character of most karkhanas might have diminished, but could not have withered until the nineteenth century. In a recent study on music, a detailed description of the royal karkhana of the early-twentieth century Baroda court, with elaborate printed regulations that applied thereon, is available (Bakhle, 2005) . I shall shortly return to the theme of what happened to the karkahanas.
By the late nineteenth century, however, the power of the patrons with almost limitless purchasing power had more or less dissipated, and whatever collective institutions existed, had to become market-oriented. We now come across a number of descriptions of collectives -in some cases the word 'guild' is actually used.
Historians of medieval urban economy noted the general scarcity of trade guilds in the Deccan, with the significant and noticeable exception of Ahmedabad. It is possible that trade guilds existed in the Eastern Deccan, the later Maratha territories, before the Muslim conquest, and atrophied thereafter. When in 1675 the British in Bombay tried to revive goldsmiths and silversmiths guild in a bid to prevent debasement of metals, the attempt had to follow British statues and conventions rather than any existing Indian custom. 4 The four clusters in which I find it convenient to classify the modern examples of collectives of producers or traders are: the Ahmedabad guilds, artisan panchayats, master-artisan collectives, and merchant communities. Between them, the nature of the regulatory system differed. The Ahemdabad guilds came closest to being formal associations, but restricted themselves to regulation in the product market. The next group, artisan panchayats, was mainly engaged in regulation in the product market, occasionally devising rules for work and workers as well. The third group, masterartisans, was mainly interested in devising collective rules to regulate the labour market. In the most famous of these four examples, merchant communities used 'community' to regulate distribution of entrepreneurial resources such as capital and trust.
Trade guilds of Ahmedabad
The strength of the institution in this one town is evident from its survival into the nineteenth century. W.W. Hunter's Imperial Gazetteer observes (1885: 87 -8) that ..the system of caste or trade unions is more fully developed in Ahmadabad than in any other part of Guzerat. Each of the different castes of traders, manufacturers and artisans, forms its own trade guild. All heads of households belong to the guild. Every member has a right to vote, and were panchayats or community associations and biradari, literally brotherhood or fraternity, the latter a term having a significant historical association with the guild.
These clubs were almost always present in craft towns of the western Gangetic plains, especially when artisans-cum-merchants handled expensive raw material.
A nineteenth century example is the smelting of precious metals. To maintain purity, smelting used to be done in Lahore, Delhi and Lucknow in common premises monitored by bodies like town councils. The maintenance of the furnace was done for a fee imposed on all members of the silver or jari merchant community. In the 1880s, it was found that the fee had no legal force. `Renegades' took advantage of this, and eventually, the payment ceased, weakening the very institution itself (Burden, 1909: 9-10) . Further examples of a similar nature from the interwar period come from Benares:
A distinct set of goldsmiths called sodhas handle gold and silver bars for converting these to wire. They are prohibited from dealing directly with the gold and silver merchants until the bar passes through the panchayats of the sodhas who guarantee the weight in payment of a fee from both the merchants and the goldsmiths (Majumdar Choudhury, 1930: 375) .
From the same town, among the silk kamkhwab weavers:
There is no union or trade guilds but customs are observed like laws, and so there is no lack of discipline. A few years ago, a disciplinary committee was formed and constitutions were made … But the committee failed due to the manager's embezzlement of the common money (Ibid., 387).
Clearly, there was greater scope for free riding in a formal rather than the informal association, though cases such as the desire to move towards a formal guild might itself signify weakening of custom.
The brotherhood concept spilled over to the merchants too, who in Benares silk weaving, rose from the ranks of the artisans themselves. 'There is a compact sense of brotherhood among the different members of the panchayats.' (Majumdar Choudhury, 1930: 371) . In this case, the commitment was used to protect advances made to individual workers. If anyone disappeared with the money, the panchayat made sure that the person did not take a job with another member.
Artisan panchayats could take up technological challenges. In perhaps the most well-known example, these efforts made the panchayat and the larger community almost indistinct. The Sourashtras were a small community of silk and cotton weavers and dyers based in textile towns of South India, the most important settlement being Madurai. Numerous reports from the colonial period suggest how the economic growth of Madurai owed `to the Saurashtra merchants and silk weavers, who have .. come to a foremost place among the ranks of [the town's] citizens ' (Thurston, 1909) . Madurai silk derived its historic reputation mainly from a red dye. In the late nineteenth century, when the dye material changed from a local plant to the mineral-based dye then imported, the adaptation of the dye to the particular style of weaving posed a problem.
The problem was solved largely through collaboration between a German dye-maker and a few Sourashtra technicians-cum-entrepreneurs. Once the new technology was found usable, it spread quickly among the community. But it needed specialized factories to enable standardization and economies of scale in handling raw material.
`Red factories', consequently, mushroomed. Fifteen years from the first experiment, Chatterton wrote that `the suburbs of Madura are now almost entirely covered with drying yards'. In 1921, half the Madras Presidency's import of synthetic dyes went to just one town (Ranga, 1930; All India Handicrafts Board, 1964) .
The period between 1880 and 1920 witnessed not only the economic transition described above, but also the deployment of an explicit sense of community in restricting access to the new knowledge and yet diffuse class formation within the group. A number of contemporaries attributed the quick spread of the new knowledge and yet its restriction to one town and one group, to the role of 'caste' as a craft guild.
What mattered was not only that the owners of the dyeing factories knew the specific formulae, but that they could secure cooperation from the workers not to work for or divulge these to outsiders. Skill-retention and training are described by observers in terms that almost depict a formal guild. Indeed, in some of these writings, the word `guild' was used (Saunders, c. 1920-22; Sastry, 1925) . And yet, no formal guild actually existed. What did exist was a correlation between community and skill, and attempts to perpetuate it. The following are two examples, fifty years apart. In 1925, Closest secrecy is maintained in preserving [the Saurashtras'] trade secrets.
Even in the employment of non-Saurashtra labour in the dyeing process, this point is as a rule strictly followed. Only Saurashtra workmen are engaged in the steaming process. In fact, wherever an element of brainwork is wanted, the Saurashtra maistries alone are wanted (Sastry, 1925) .
and as recently as 1976
There are some trade secrets pertaining to the work of textile printing. These secrets are never divulged to any body, particularly a non-Saurashtrian. The non-Saurashtri labourers are engaged in textile printing, but they are not shown any secret of the trade. (Dave, 1976) The other side of such exclusion was 'strong esprit de corps', a constant theme in the context of Madurai's quality of work. It can also be found or invoked in other contexts, like the rarity of violent disputes, and diffused class-formation. Even as capitalism grew roots in Madurai, Sourashtra production remained confined in families and there was a remarkable weakness of proletarianization in the community. To a large extent this was made possible by an informal agreement among the employers not to employ outsiders in this business. Indeed, new entry is so difficult that it appears as 'virtually a closed industry so far as the labour force is concerned', the stated reason being the historic association between Sourashtra labour and high-quality work (Singh, 1981) . The unity was also seen in matters of trust, '[T]hey are very keen to stick to truth in their dealings ' (Dave, 1976) . And they 'seldom borrow from other than their castemen' (Saunders, c. 1920-22:116) . The turn of the century also saw the most significant attempts to consciously recreate a Sourashtra identity. Linguistic-literary movements, and institutions associated with identity-formation and assertion of common identity, had their origin in these decades.
Master artisans
At 1900, royal karkhanas affiliated to regional courts still existed, but this was a minor context for the use of the term. The more commonplace context was urban artisan organization. The terms that described urban artisan organization in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries -karkhana, karkhanadar, ustad and shagirdwere inherited from precolonial period. The term karkhanadar deserves particular attention because it symbolized regulation and hierarchy of an informal kind.
By 1900, the word karkhana had bifurcated into two distinct sets of meaning.
Outside northern India, in the handloom weaving towns of Bombay-Deccan, karkhana referred to any small factory and the karkhanadar to the generic owner of the factory.
In the early nineteenth century Kashmir shawl, Irwin (1954) Burmese firms engaged in credit and commerce. This ascendancy has been explained in terms of the Chettiars' superior business organization that had long been at work, in particular, to long apprenticeship, training in business ethics and techniques (such as a special accounting system), group solidarity, inter-firm lending, and informal sanctions to minimize default within the group. Chettiar enterprise in Burma, however, became caught up in an economic and political crisis in the 1930s, eventually forcing most firms to leave Burma.
These firms formed 'networks' in that the participants shared scarce resources such as credit and information. They functioned in environments that lacked efficient regulatory or communication systems. Yet opportunism and fraud by insiders did not threaten the network. The explanation seems to lie in the fact that the firms recruited principals and agents from the same social pool. Community was an important resource, and yet communal cooperation, founded on a mix of calculation and emotion, was neither invariant nor free from contradictions. A large part of the success as well as failures derived from who gave directions to whom. Hierarchical authority was intrinsic to the success of the community, but since hierarchies were often based on seniority rather than managerial competence, challenging authority was also not unknown.
In the nineteenth century, many Indian workers also went to work in the tropical colonies, and created settlements there. These settlements and the merchant diasporas differed on one significant point, among possibly many. With both labourers and capitalists, the individual who travelled abroad continued for some time to be part of a social-cum-economic unit that remained behind. In the case of merchant migration, the economic ties were of a principal-agent type, resulted in two-way flow of benefits, and formed part of a system of inter-and intrafirm dependence. With migrating labourers, these ties were less systematic, more asymmetric, more emotive, and weaker as a result.
Conclusion
I now tie up this diverse material into four propositions.
First, the material suggests the rarity of associations containing the formal character of a European guild in late-medieval to modern South Asia. It is not even certain that professional associations that were monopolistic and political once existed and disappeared through a competitive process. At least the existing evidence on the subject does not clearly point to such a hypothesis.
Second, collective regulation of product, labour, and entrepreneurship was common. The artisan panchayats, master-artisan combines, and merchant communities were all engaged in doing this. It is also possible, and indeed hinted at in scholarship on the artisan, that the strength of caste and community associations in fact increased from the mid-nineteenth century, signifying the fact that these institutions did have a positive role in mitigating the hazards of new kinds of competition (Haynes, 1983 (Haynes, , 2001 . I have suggested, in the case of North Indian karkhanadari that these informal institutions may have had roots in older practices (Roy, 1999) .
Can we read a pattern in this variety? Did regions, cities and castes devise their own regulatory system in a random way, or was there a general framework of regulation working behind all these examples? Here comes the third proposition on the origins of informal collectives such as we encounter in South Asia.
Let us proceed with the assumption that the guild was unnecessary in South Asia because some of its major functions could be addressed by other means already available in premodern enterprise. I have made the point elsewhere, in a context of labour control, that the early employers in mills, plantations, or overseas labour markets would have found two readily available models of labour organization in India of the 1830s, which I call the master-artisan model and the headman model (Roy, forthcoming a). Many villages under joint landlordship or communal control over resources had the institution of headman already firmly established.
Contemporary observers noted the existence of a powerful headman in all such contexts. The most common mode of contracting in the nineteenth century artisanate was putting out by using the services of a master artisan, or in some case, headman in a weavers' village. A great deal of the research on early modern textile exports from the Coromandel coast revolves on the role of the headman. In both cases, one among the collective undertook to deliver a contracted quantity and quality of effort. I wish to extend this argument to the management of productive resources other than labour.
My third thesis in this paper is that the guild was unnecessary because two pre-existing models of control over entrepreneurial resources were already in existence: masters and community. I also wish to suggest that these two were not distinct systems, but mutually compatible, even two sides of the same coin. In descriptions on the master-artisans, the community is visible in the background, in writings on the community, headship is visible in the background. Community control over resources was prevalent and successful among South Asian merchants, as numerous studies have shown. In almost all cases, community and hierarchy joined together, and reinforced one another.
The cooperative community was, like the guild or the firm, an institution that reduced certain types of transactions costs. Between these three types of nonmarket hierarchies -the firm, the guild and the community -conditions of entry differed. The entry into a firm was conditional upon a promise to deliver service, that into a guild was fee-based, and entry in a cooperative community was relational.
These relationships were structured by drawing on kinship and other social conventions. Thus, between the three, the cooperative community was by nature the most informal. And yet, that informality had notions of seniority, rank and precedence built into it. None of these institutions was democratic. The cooperative community was probably the least democratic of all, since questioning economic authority in this set up amounted to questioning social norms. The ustad, karkhanadar, or more generally the headman, was not a different system from the merchant community. The headman was intrinsic to the idea of a community. The head represented the channel of negotiation between the community and the market, a channel without which presumably the community would break up into chaos. In many instances from South Asia, what we observe is this community-cumheadman package, as an alternative to the guild.
That being said, the master-artisan was a particular kind of headman, in possession of technical knowledge and in principle a vehicle of innovation and a conduit for acceptance of innovation. I have argued elsewhere that this particular role of the master artisan introduced a certain degree of instability in the mastercollective relationship by generating adverse reaction to innovation (Roy, forthcoming b).
Formal and informal rules might become equivalent in terms of regulation, but these were not equivalent from the perspective of association building and lawmaking processes. Informal rules were not substantively equivalent, and not a sufficient substitute for formal statutes. This is the fourth proposition of the paper.
Community-based institutions were by definition exclusionary institutions, whereas guilds were exclusionary according to historical circumstances. Further, the absence of formal statutes meant that when contract laws and associational laws were finally written out, the model was the English practices rather than any Indian benchmark. 9 Third, community-based alliances were social institutions that did contribute to a measure of mutual trust and responsibility in intra-community dealings, but did not create the 'consciousness of being men of the same calling' (Das Gupta, 2004: 131) .
Caste brought people together, but only on the social level; and I would add, it created divisions within a profession, for 'birth still is a more important fact in India' than profession (Das Gupta, 2004: 130, 193) . With a few exceptions, the associational principle never had the chance to detach itself completely from social ties.
